How should we write the history of a discipline which now presents itself as a constellation of sociological and psychological approaches taking for their object crime and the criminal, but once identified itself as a science? The acknowledgement of the rhetorical power during the nineteenth century of scientific metaphors and allusions, and a loose reference to the nefarious effects of a faith in positivism, is insufficient. Looking at the problem from the other direction, beyond antiquarian accounts of quackery and all its eccentricities, beyond also the denunciation of 'pseudo-sciences' and a whole host of other charlatans, what else can be said? Perhaps a start can be made by confronting this discipline with a part of its past about which it has been quiet. This may be pursued under the rubrics of three questions: why has the history of criminology marginalized the history of scientific techniques in the pursuit of the criminal? What style of reasoning did these techniques employ? How are we to destabilize the disciplinary history of scientific methods in the search for the criminal? This paper may be usefully framed with the outlines of a mystery. The third edition of the Handbuchfiir Untersuchungsrichter published by Hans Gross in 1899 presented the following cipher:
How should we write the history of a discipline which now presents itself as a constellation of sociological and psychological approaches taking for their object crime and the criminal, but once identified itself as a science? The acknowledgement of the rhetorical power during the nineteenth century of scientific metaphors and allusions, and a loose reference to the nefarious effects of a faith in positivism, is insufficient. Looking at the problem from the other direction, beyond antiquarian accounts of quackery and all its eccentricities, beyond also the denunciation of 'pseudo-sciences' and a whole host of other charlatans, what else can be said? Perhaps a start can be made by confronting this discipline with a part of its past about which it has been quiet. This may be pursued under the rubrics of three questions: why has the history of criminology marginalized the history of scientific techniques in the pursuit of the criminal? What style of reasoning did these techniques employ? How are we to destabilize the disciplinary history of scientific methods in the search for the criminal? This paper may be usefully framed with the outlines of a mystery. The third edition of the Handbuchfiir Untersuchungsrichter published by Hans Gross in 1899 presented the following cipher:
This cipher is heavily implicated in the enquiry conducted by this paper, and the approach taken in decoding it will be of the utmost significance.
Scientific Methods of Criminal Investigation and the History of Criminobgy
It is to be noted that studies analysing the history of scientific practices of criminal investigation have not come from the history of criminology. Recent contributions to the field have come from the genres of social history (Kaluszynski 1987; Darmon 1989) , the history of photography (Ph61ine 1985; Tagg 1988) , the history of science (Panchasi 1996) , and the history of the body (Sekula 1986) . The history of criminology has offered only a r£sum£ of the discoveries of a few 'pioneers' (Mannheim 1960; Stead 1977) and the documenting of the identification methods of the fin de siecle (Radzinowicz and Hood 1986; Hebenton and Thomas 1993) . With regard to the latter, first, the history of criminology has analysed neither the details of the scientific bases of the techniques nor how they actually worked. Secondly, identification methods have been subsumed within the narrative of the 'taming' of the habitual criminal. The concern about recidivism was of importance to the development of identification methods, but is not the whole story. Finally, there are important differences between criminal investigation ('who was the author of this crime?' 'how can we find him or her?' 'how can we demonstrate in court that this suspect was the author of this crime?') and methods for the identification of habitual criminals ('does this criminal before me have prior sentences?').
What is to be made of the paucity of attention given to scientific methods of criminal investigation within the history of criminology? It can be explained by three historiographical characteristics of histories of criminology: first, the charting of the ways in which a conception of criminal behaviour constituted criminology; secondly, a preoccupation with the prison; and finally, an interest in charting the demarcation of a professional discipline of criminology from the 1880s. Each of these features is conceptually linked. Michel Foucault's Surveiller et punir (1975) demonstrated how the prison of the nineteenth century operated as a laboratory from which emerged the figure of a new species, the delinquent or homo criminalis, bearer of physical and/or psychological stigmata that could be read as the indications of a propensity to commit crime. From thence also came the swarm of extra-judicial experts who claimed the authority to diagnose such signs and formulate treatment regimes, advise governments on the administration of a penalty which should adapt itself to their findings. From the outset and to this day the momentum of these features has been guaranteed by their failure. As such they exist in a concomitant relationship with their inverse. The concentration on a conception of criminal behaviour has as its counterparts the interest in social milieu and also an interest not in the offender but in the offence itself. The converse of a professional discipline of criminology is the multiplicity of'lay' discourses about crime and criminals. The counterpart of the preoccupation with the prison is to address social control outside its walls and this includes all manner of policing, including criminal investigation.
First then, the history of criminology would like to take as the foundation of this discipline the introduction of a conception of criminal behaviour. This 'conception of 89 criminal behaviour' refers to the host of demonstrations of the existence of a criminality predisposing an individual to commit offences and simultaneously explaining the recalcitrance of his recidivism (see, for example, Garland 1994) . The interest here has been in propensities, penchants, dispositions and constitutions. The essays in intellectual history by Piers Beirne (1993) have, however, demonstrated that a rigid division between classical and positive schools in this respect is untenable. Additionally, the interest in tracing the new scientific interest in the conception of criminal behaviour should have had no need to exclude consideration of the use of scientific methods of criminal investigation. The practice of these methods, and the many handbooks, theses, tracts and casenotes that elaborated their use, yield up a whole range of information about the criminal that could be used to impute to him certain traits. The development of scientific methods of criminal identification was particularly ambiguous in this respect. The study of the tattoo as a means of criminal identification offered indications of social position from Tardieu's investigations at the mid-century (Tardieu 1855) at the same time as Lacassagne's publications in the 1880s. Data from the Bertillon system of identification was used to attest to the existence of a criminal type (McCorn 1896).
The morphology and anomalies of the ear were described both as a means of individual identification and as a potential indicator of degeneracy and criminal type (Lannois (1887) collates and comments on this work).
The history of criminology has described the consolidation of a professional discipline of criminology from the 1880s. First, if a professional discipline of criminology is to be recognized, the story of a multiplicity of 'lay' discourses about crime and criminals also requires analysis. The popular conception of a criminologist as some species of'scientific detective' is of significance here. Additionally, examination of the documents from which the formation of a professional discipline of criminology in the fin de siecle period has been constructed provides no reason to have marginalized the history of scientific methods of criminal investigation from this tale. The identification of criminology with an institutional locus has produced discussion of the foundation of chairs and departments in the universities, the establishment of specialist reviews, and the gathering of international meetings. The confrontations between the Lyonnaise school and the Scuola Positiva at the criminal anthropology congresses of the 1880s and 1890s have become a tale often told. The presence from the outset of an interest in judicial anthropometry and the problem of the identification of the criminal may also be noted. Records show that on 20 November 1885 Alphonse Bertillon, head of the Service D'ldentitie" Judiciaire of the Paris police gave an address to the first congress about his system of judicial anthropometry. Following this address, the first person to comment was Cesare Lombroso, praising Bertillon for having demonstrated what he designated as one of the practical sides of anthropology, with his system of'everyday usefulness'. The next person to speak was Alexandre Lacassagne, the medico-legist around whose work the Lyon school developed, and famous for his Pasteurian analogy of society as the culture from which the germs of criminality sprang, which expressed his concept of social milieu (see Kaluszynski 1988) . Lacassagne recounted the effectiveness of Bertillon's system in discovering the judicial antecedents of a 'skilful crook' in Lyon. 1 Gall (1758 Gall ( -1828 , and has recognized the place of 'practitioners' such as prison doctors in the prehistory of criminology. However, there is still a sense in which these have been presented as prefiguring the development of an academic discipline which is their success and culmination, and the history of criminology as emanating from, and acting upon, a wider range of practices still remains to be written.
Criminologists are by now familiar with the idea of the nineteenth century prison as a 'surface of emergence' for their discipline. The operation of the prison as a locus from which knowledge about the nature of criminals, and the methods for their treatment, emerged has led the history of criminology to privilege penitentiary science as the most important condition of existence of criminology. However, SurveiUer et punir is not a genealogy of criminology. We need to look beyond the prison to address not only the proceedings of the courtroom and the extra-judicial aspects of the individualization of the sentence, but also the investigations prior to that point.
Contemporary with the birth of the prison there occurred the 'reform' of the police, to which the use of scientific methods of criminal investigation was significant, and both changes were part of a redistribution of the overall punitive apparatus. This was not lost on eighteenth-century commentators. From the mid-eighteenth century the great penal reformers also criticized existing methods for apprehending criminals and considered the place of detection in deterrence. Cesare Beccaria's Dei delitti e dellepene of 1764 not only condemned capital punishment, but also the system of rewards for the apprehension of criminals, the latter being one proof of the weakness of a government. Beccaria also pointed out that for the purposes of deterrence, if the severity of punishments were to be decreased, the certainty of detection must be correspondingly increased. The latter was seen as the index of a superior efficiency (not to punish more, but to punish better). In 1789, Jeremy Bentham's/ln Introduction To The Principles Of Morals And Legislation addressed the psychology of motivation as subordinated to the 'two sovereign masters', pain and pleasure. Bentham considered that an individual's perception of the likelihood of their having committed an obnoxious act being detected by another person was essential to the action of this restraining motive upon them. The Fieldings had started the collection of information about criminals intended to supply clues for their detection from the mid-eighteenth century. Despite their activities, in 1796 Patrick Colquhoun stated in his A Treatise On
The Police Of The Metropolis:
As the laws now stand, no energy enters into the system of detection, so as to give vigour and effect to that branch of police which relates to the apprehension of persons charged with offences . . . (Colquhoun 1796: 22) In Surveilltr et punir, Foucault saw generalized policing, or surveillance, as the concomitant of the invention of delinquency, which led him to suggest that we should perhaps speak of an ensemble police-prison-delinquency. Criminal investigation, the detection of the unknown authors of crimes which had already been committed, is not identical with the pre-emptive surveillance of suspect populations discussed by Foucault (1975) . What place did criminal investigation occupy? Did it promise the possibility of a seamless surveillance? This may provide a partial answer, but if criminal investigation is to be wholly integrated into the police-prison-delinquency ensemble, there is a surplus consideration. Criminal investigation has had only a very superficial interest in the aetiological question of what caused an individual to commit a crime. The interest extended only as far as would be useful to the apprehension of the culpable party. Perhaps the counterpart to a diffused criminality is the attempt to fix, locate and control it, first within the body and secondly within distinct spaces such as rookeries, slums, and neighbourhoods. Methods for the identification of the criminal can be seen to have had a complex relationship to criminological theories.
2 The observation and analysis of characteristics of the material conditions of the scene of the crime that reached a new intensity with the use of scientific methods from the nineteenth century can be seen as part of a new control of spaces.
The Style of Reasoning of Scientific Methods of Criminal Investigation
What kind of more refined practices of investigation were introduced with the new scientific methods? What style of reasoning did they employ? Published work that has addressed the identification of the criminal has accepted the 'conjectural model' described by Carlo Ginzburg (1980) as the basis of the methodologies of the new scientific approaches of the late nineteenth century.
3 This 'conjectural model' involved the use of evidence that would be imperceptible to most people, adducing information from sources that to all but the expert appeared inconsequential. According to Ginzburg, during the decade 1870-80 a presumptive model emerged which operated on the basis of the denial that reality was opaque and used the clue or the symptom as a privileged zone by means of which the expert could gain access to a deeper reality. This method could be traced back to a medical semiotics that used the detailed observation of superficial symptoms to diagnose diseases inaccessible to direct study, and hence back to Hippocratic medicine. For Ginzburg the disciplines that he identified as following a conjectural model were qualitative, and demonstrated an interest in the individual, as opposed to a paradigm based on Galilean physics and hence requiring quantification. Ginzburg traced the roots of the conjectural model to the practices of divination and the tracking of animals, as both involved the minute analysis of details for the purpose of elucidating the vestiges of events beyond the direct perception of the observer. This formed part of Ginzburg's project to undo the opposition between 'rationalism' and 'irrationalism'. As such, Ginzburg's genealogy of a conjectural model has been used to question the objectivity of new scientific methods of identification. Roxanne Panchasi's 1996 paper on the development of expertise in writing, or graphology, uses Ginzburg's conjectural model to destabilise Michon's development of graphology as a scientific discipline. Michon's 1880 m£moire sought to restate the infallibility of his scientific methods in graphology in the light of several cases in which his expertise had been slighted in a judicial setting, for example his assertion that a contested will was a forgery. In this publication Michon opposed his graphology to 'the old conjectural practice of the ancient expert opinions' (1880: 15):
Graphology clearly rejects conjecture. If it does not find by means of graphic anatomy some tangible overwhelming proof of the truth or falsehood of a writing it says straight out: I lack proof, I pronounce no decision. (1880: 13-14) 4 Certainly, as Panchasi noted, Michon sought to distance himself from his earlier collaboration with Desbarolles. The frontispiece of their book of 1872, Les mystfrres de l'ecriture, depicted an expert in consultation with a woman, and a phrenological head was clearly represented in the background of the scene. As such Michon turned to the indisputable objectivity of 'the graphic law' which he asserted left nothing to chance. Seeing graphology as resting on a conjectural model means that Michon's opposition of scientific method and incompetence, of truth and fraud, can be dissolved.
While admitting the applicability of Ginzburg's model to some identification techniques, the conjectural model cannot be accepted as a general model able to explain either the methodology of all identification techniques or the broader range of scientific methods of criminal investigation. Ginzburg renders the clue and the symptom analogous as routes to the access of a deeper reality. However, in criminal investigation the clue was always read very superficially. Additionally, quantification has played an important part in the methodologies of scientific methods of criminal investigation. Finally, the privileging of the decade 1870-80 for the emergence of Ginzburg's model may be challenged. Within criminology, in the criminal anthropology of the late nineteenth century it could be said that the symptom was used to access the deeper reality of criminality. Those interested in the aetiology of criminal behaviour sometimes used the techniques of criminal identification methods as these suggested enhanced exactness. Additionally, those who refined techniques of criminal identification also had an anthropological interest. In legal psychology an interest in the study of the psychology of the criminal can also be discerned. However, in other areas of the scientific methods of criminal investigation, for example the analysis of poisons, blood, dust, an interest in obtaining access to an anterior and deeper reality is not a concern. It could be said that these methods of criminal investigation developed an almost banal administrative relationship based on the differentiation of the constituent substances of materials.
To commence with a challenge to Ginzburg's chronology. Welsh (1992) charted how circumstantial evidence rose to become the most favoured form of proof from the second half of the eighteenth century, indicating here the significance of the growth of probabilistic thinking that has been explored in the work of Ian Hacking (1975 Hacking ( , 1990 ). By 1838 Wills was able to conclude that in practice circumstantial evidence was often superior as a mode of proof to the average strength of 'direct evidence'.
5 It may be noted in passing that the acknowledged precedent for the use of science in an English court is the Folkes v. Chadd case of 1782 in which a civil engineer addressed the question of why Wells harbour had silted up. 6 This case also involved the presentation of handwriting evidence. From physics, a case was cited by Foder£ (1813) of a nocturnal murder in which the witnesses claimed to have recognized the culprit from the flash of a pistol shot. The physical sciences class of the Institute was consulted, which made experiments and answered that this was not possible. In the field of ballistics, from 1835 Henry Goddard began to make comparisons between bullet striations and the rifling in gun barrels. Boutigny published a paper in 1834 on the question of determining the time when a weapon had been discharged. A policeman and an expert gunsmith had differed in their opinion, so Boutigny was consulted. His experiments examined the colouring of the discharge deposited on the battery and detected the presence of iron oxide (Boutigny 1834).
Toxicology The methods of chemistry were also applied to the question of whether a sample of blood was of human or animal origin. The first volume of die Archives d'hygi&ne publique et de midecine Ugale carried a paper on this question (Barruel 1829 ; see Chevallier and Barruel 1834 for a report of experiments to resolve this question during the course of a criminal investigation). Other materials were also subjected to chemical analysis to establish their identity for the purposes of criminal investigations, notably stains suspected to be those of semen ; see Bayard 1839 for a detailed microscopic analysis of suspected semen stains in the context of enquiries related to sexual offences). CKemical analysiswas also used to examine writing suspected of having been forged or odierwise tampered widi (Chevallier 1826; Barruel and Chevallier 1834) . This latter activity hence predated considerably Michon's recasting of graphology as a scientific discipline.
The increased use of circumstantial evidence involved a whole critique of the value of the mbnoire visueUe as practised by witnesses, defendants, policemen, and examining magistrates. This involved both the adoption of scientific methods of observation, recording and analysis, and also the subjection of the psychological processes of perception, forgetting, recall, and the interrogation of witnesses and the accused, to a sustained analysis. The adoption of scientific methods was then first made on the basis of the human inadequacies of the mhnoire visuelle. One group of such methods was that used for the identification of the criminal. These methods were intended to replace practices such as the weekly visits of detectives to prisons in order to both memorize the faces of inmates and also to point out any recidivists that they recognized. Charles Dickens provided a sketch of this procedure in his tales of Mr Pickwick, with the latter undergoing a scrutiny by the turnkeys on his admittance to the Fleet as a debtor. In Dickens's story, published in 1836-37, this ceremonial was termed 'sitting for your portrait' (Dickens 1975: 660-62) . The Belper committee report of 1901 found no reason to discontinue such visits of detectives to British prisons but they were finally ceased in 1903.
The methods of the judicial photography of criminals intervened to aid the memory and later to submit the image of the criminal and his body to the precision of measurements. The old descriptive methods of signalment were considered as too imprecise and too subjective, typically employing such vague terms as 'oval face, big nose'. These were to be replaced by the objectivity and reliability of standardized procedures, and all based on the belief in the infallibility of a realist paradigm which has been discussed by Christian Phe"line (1985) and Alan Sekula (1986). 7 An instance of the operation of such strategies may be observed in Bertillon's activities following the bombing attacks in Paris of 20 February 1891. Two bombs were placed at Parisian residences, and simultaneously a letter was delivered to two commissioners of police announcing that on their receipt their author, 'Rabardy', would commit suicide. One of these devices killed a woman. The cadaver of an unknown was subsequently discovered in the peristyle of La Madeleine, the cause of death being the explosion of a device identical in construction to those placed at the two residences. Bertillon was called in as expert and found himself faced with the problem of the post-mortem identity of a mutilated cadaver. Police searches had revealed that the name 'Rabardy' was an alias, but the cadaver was before long suspected to be that of a militant anarchist named Pauwels. The question then arose as to whether the surviving occupants of the residences atwhich the bombs were placed could recognize the cadaver as Pauwels either from memory or from comparison with judicial photographs of Pauwels while living. This presented difficulties for the witnesses. First, they had only seen the suspect briefly during the mundane operation of the letting of a room, and in poor lighting. Secondly, the mutilated state of the cadaver made its identification with the living subject complicated. However Bertillon was able by means of his photograph of Pauwels to remain unshaken in his conviction of the identity of the false 'Rabardy' with the Belgian anarchist Pauwels (Bertillon 1894).
The photography of the scene of the crime was similarly developed as a check on the prejudices and distortions exercised by the mimoire visuelle. Niceforo marked out the practices of'scientific criminal investigation' from the 'deluge' of words resorted to for a description of the scene of the crime in an 1847 murder case (Niceforo, 1907: 2) . The lens of the camera embraced all in its field of view, missing no detail that might be passed over by the human eye. It also provided a faithful record of a crime scene whose condition would deteriorate with the presence of investigators and with the passage of time to make observations at a later date unreliable.
The use of judicial photography is not a phenomenon dating from the fin de siecle. First, the idea predated the technology. In 1819 a certain Huvet, employed as a clerk in the office of prisons, proposed to the Prefect of Police of Paris the establishment of a 'gallery of portraits of the subversive elements of society', obtained with the aid of a 'physniotrace'. This apparatus would record the projection given by the outline of the shadow made by the body on a surface when it was placed between the surface and a luminous point (Liaisons 1979: 5) . Secondly, there was not a delay of 40 years from the introduction of the first reliable photographic process to its application for judicial purposes. Following Louis Daguerre's publication of the daguerreotype process in 1839 the Paris police were using photographs of criminals from at least 1841, and a case involving the use of judicial photography was reported in Lausanne in 1854 (Pheline 1985) . By this year the governor of Bristol gaol, Anthony Gardiner, was circulating photographs of his prisoners to every prison in the country to see if any apparently first-time offenders were actually recidivists (Gernsheim 1965: 514-15) . In this same year of 1854 another Lacan, the editor of the photographic review La Lumiire, discussed the suggestion of an inspector of prisons that the photographic index of inmates established at a prison in Alsace be generalized throughout France. Importantly, he proposed the addition of a 'graphometric' index (Lacan 1854) . In the following issue of this review an engineer named Eugene Beau suggested modifications to this system including the introduction of metric measurement: a scale to enable the calculation of bodily dimensions should be placed in the frame (Phe"line 1985) .
These new methods did not go unopposed. First, there are several records of criminals refusing to be photographed. Griffiths (1894) tells the tale of an unknown tramp, who threw himself on the ground to avoid the accusing eye of the camera, was subsequently photographed without his knowledge, and recognized to be one 'Red Rufus', who had committed a murder (Griffiths 1894: 170-85) . There are photographs which show the criminal struggling while being held by guards or police (Luke 1980: 125) . At the third international congress of criminal anthropology in 1893, De Ryckere reported the penalties existing in France and Switzerland for those who refused to be measured according to the Bertillon system. This was a consideration addressed by Bertillon from the time of his first publication:
We don't have to examine the question of up to what point a society has the right to measure a defendant against his will. Let's say however that the measurements of our system can if need be, be taken by force with a sufficient approximation. (Bertillon 1890: n. 28) In 1885 a Home Office prison rule made the refusal to be photographed a breach of prison discipline to be punished. Judicial photography and anthropometric measurements evoked questions of civil liberties. They also offended bourgeois sentiments of propriety and respectability. In 1897 Paul Aubry criticized press reports of the shame of measurement, referring to what he saw as the ridiculous prejudice which consisted in seeing ignominy in measurement. Certainly the celebration of the Bertillon system at the Exposition of 1900 (see Rey and Feron 1900) also had its detractors. The press reported the case of an unfortunate whose mugshot was recognized among Bertillon's rogue's gallery, having been arrested for begging several years earlier. The publication of Bertillon measurements and photographs was (unsuccessfully) used as the basis for a libel action at the turn of the century in the United States of America (reported by Anonymous 1903).
The development of new scientific methods of identification sought to replace the dissimulation and error of witnesses. Testimony remained central to die judicial process and retained an important role in the investigative process, so it became important to make an appreciation of its value and features. With the development of legal psychology, these variations of perception, memory, and recall were to be made part of a discipline that sought to submit them to rigorous experimentation and analysis to elicit their value for the deposition of evidence. The deformation of the actual events that had taken place down a chain of witnesses, the subjective character of perception, the foibles of memory, the difficulties of recall, and the most effective techniques of interrogation were studied. Investigation of the testimonial process by means of experimental psychology could demonstrate how to correct the systematic deformations. A specialist journal on the psychology of testimony, the Beitrage zur Psychologie der Aussage, was introduced in 1903 under the direction of Stern (in 1908 this changed its name to Zeitschrifi fiir angewandte Psychologie). Hugo Miinsterberg (1909), who had been a pupil of Wundt in Leipzig in the 1880s, presented numerous descriptions of his experiments with students of the Harvard psychology course and applied them to legal psychology. The idea that a large number of judicial errors were due to false or erroneous testimonies became propagated (see for example Lailler and Vovoven 1897) and experiments also demonstrated that error in testimony was the rule rather than the exception. E. M. Forster's/4 Passage To India (1924) used the ambiguity of whether details had been remembered or imagined as the crux of the courtroom scene of his novel.
In The Psychopathology Of Everyday Life (1901) Sigmund Freud analysed actions that had previously been seen as due to chance and argued that in fact they were strictly determined. His psychic determinism led him to posit purposeless actions as symptomatic of complexes. If by the 1970s criminalistics was being defined as the identification and evaluation of 'material' or 'physical' evidence, at the turn of the century it still included psychology. The use of psychoanalysis was explored by criminalists at the turn of the century. In The Psychopathology Of Everyday Life, first published in 1901, Freud referred to Hans Gross's experiments with what Freud termed 'a technique for the diagnosis of facts' (Freud 1938: 191-2,n.l) .In 1906, Jung published Die Psychobgische Diagnose des Tatbestandes on the subject of the use of association experiments in criminal interrogation. Freud's 1906 paper, 'Psychoanalysis And The Ascertaining Of Truth In Courts Of Law' was first published in a journal edited by Hans Gross (Archiv fur Kriminalanthropologie undKrimmalistik) . 8 This paper was first presented in a seminar to law students (Jones 1967: 379; Freud 1956 ). Freud referred to the work of Wertheimer and Klein, two pupils of Gross in Prague who were the first to experiment with word association as a method of investigation by which the accused or the witness would be led to betray himself. Freud wanted to differentiate between his clinical work with the hysteric and the work of the investigator with the criminal, and his paper warned against the drawing of simple analogies between the two. According to Freud, both the criminal and the hysteric had something to hide, the difference being that whereas the criminal knew this and intentionally concealed the information from the investigator, the hysteric was unaware of the hidden material. The hysteric was plagued by repressed psychic material as the criminal was by a guilty conscience. However, the hysteric, desiring a cure for various unpleasant symptoms, would co-operate with the process of uncovering hidden complexes and the criminal would not co-operate. For the hysteric, resistance to bringing complexes into consciousness was located at the boundary between the unconscious whereas for the criminal resistance wholly originated within conscious life. This latter consideration meant that complexes in the criminal might not be betrayed by the same signs as the unconscious resistance of the hysteric.
Hans Gross taught a course on legal psychology in Graz from 1894. In his Kriminal Psychologie (1897) Gross discussed the operations of sensory perception in their influences on the administration of the law, and also what he termed 'phenomenology,' or the study of appearances. This field of investigation was directed at ' ... the systematic co-ordination of those outer symptoms occasioned by inner processes, and conversely, the inference from the symptoms to them' (Gross 1918: 41) . Gross defined his phenomenology as 'the semiotic of normal psychology', differentiating it in this respect from the 'psychopathic semiotic' of the Scuola Positiva. He drew attention to the significance of, for example, reflex movements, laughter, and the making of such observations as how a man wore his hat, writing that: 'Every mental event must have its corresponding physical event in some form, and is therefore capable of being sensed, or known to be indicated by some trace' (Gross 1918: 42) . Such observations would have corroborative value when a large number of them were brought together and analogies were drawn. Gross stressed the importance of unconscious operations in establishing what was significant concerning the individual. He advised his criminalist reader to study the literature of memory, especially with regard to the forgetting of pain and fear, and also the literature on language, whereby the criminalist could learn how to discern the significance of definitive images from apparently worthless statements. Ginzburg (1980) explained that the new conjectural model was based on a medical semiotics. The new scientific methods of criminal investigation applied the natural, physical and mathematical sciences to the resolution of both old and new sets of questions. S£v. Causs^'s 1854 paper provides an example here, which used the methods of geometry to discern whether footprints left on the scene of a crime could be identified with those of the suspect. The paper began by posing its problem in this way:
The practice of medical jurisprudence raises, from time to time, new and interesting questions, of which the solution is sometimes difficult, and puts the expert in an awkward position. One does not find then, neither in die authors nor in die scientific documents, any fact which can serve as a guide.
The specialist called upon in these cases finds himself obliged to assess all by himself and to create a modus faciendi, which extricates him from the predicament in which circumstances have placed him.
After citing several cases of the 1840s involving the measurement of footprints left on the scene of the crime, Causse' elaborated his method and concluded with regard to the study of prints: ... it can reveal a striking identity, as a result of mathematical demonstration, between the incriminating prints and those formed by the feet of the accused ' (1854: 179-80) .
To the extent that Ginzburg's conjectural model identified itself with qualitative methods and in opposition to quantification, its general application to the new scientific methods used in criminal investigation may be challenged. Ginzburg did not apply his model to all of the new methods. However, he did specify the Bertillon system of identification.
9
In 1860 Stevens, director of Louvain Prison, called attention to Quetelet's theories and suggested the measurement of all adult criminals for the purposes of identification. Bertillon's first publication on judicial anthropometry dated from 1881, and commenced by reviewing the signaletic value of the various bodily characteristics hitherto used in signalment, with the following as its touchstone:
. . . this dual consideration: fixity in the denomination of the characteristic in the same individual and variability from one individual to another. (Bertillon 1890: 15) Bertillon then presented tables and barcharts summarizing figures resulting from an ensemble of over 10,000 observations or measurements that he made in 1880. In this way he found that the colour of the hair was only a signaletic characteristic in the case of blond or red hair. Bertillon sought to locate his 'invention' within the critique of the mhnoire visuelle, with the replacement of 'the old eccentric signalment ' (de Laveleye 1907) . In his address to the first international congress of criminal anthropology at Rome in 1885 Bertillon announced: To make these expressions more precise, it is necessary to replace the qualifications: medium, small, big, oval, large, etc., with numbers', and claimed with regard to his system: 'A man characterised in this way by measurements is mathematically identified' (Bertillon 1886). Bertillon pointed out that his methods were based on Quetelet's binomial curve and also identified his activities with those of Paul Broca, who had steered anthropology in a medical direction which made use of quantification with his statistical craniology.
Likewise for Bertillon's development of the metric photography of the scene of the crime. As the Intransigiant pointed out in 1909, ordinary photography did not respect perspective and deformed objects placed before the camera. The Echo de Paris posed the problem in this way:
Dimensions, distances, used to be evaluated with difficulty from a photograph. How to transform a perspective view into a geometric plan from which one can determine mathematically-and practically without calculation-the dimensions of objects and their distance? (Echo de Paris 1903) The press reported that Bertillon had solved these problems with his imposition of a standard scale of reduction and introduction of a metric scale into the frame of the photograph. This is not to deny all significance of Ginzburg's conjectural model in this area. Its application to Bertillon's portrait parl6 method of identification is cogent. This involved a methodical description by observation alone-no instruments were used. A special vocabulary noted the signalment in response to questions formulated as rubrics on a printed formulaire. Only extreme characteristics were written on the fiche. Forrester (1996) has demonstrated that the genealogy of the case is useful to the history of psychoanalysis. It is also useful to some aspects of the history of criminology, and particularly to the understanding of the use of psychotherapeutic methods in the treatment of the criminal. However, the history of scientific methods of criminal investigation cannot be fitted into this schema unproblematically.
The Genealogical Method, Criminology, and Scientific Methods of Criminal Investigation
This paper has sought to demonstrate that the history of scientific methods in criminal investigation is of considerable significance to the history of criminology, not least in emancipating the latter from its preoccupation with the prison. It also aims to show that the genealogical method substantially questions the disciplinary histories of both criminology and the practice of scientific methods of criminal investigation.
10 With regard to the latter we are thinking of the celebration of the evolution of methods to elicit the macabre evidence of 'Us traces revelatrices', 'these mute witnesses'. There has been much brief summary of This progressive substitution of the evidence of facts for human evidence . . . ' (Sanni£ 1954) ." The rhetoric of the detective novel is often not far from these accounts: 'A simple thread left by the culprit can become Ariadne's thread' (Locard 1920: 157) . Here mythology, narrative and criminal investigation are ambiguously overdetermined in the noun 'fiT (thread).
Ginzburg's genealogy of a conjectural model means that we can question the objectivity of such new methods. Certainly we cannot accept without scrutiny Edmond Locard's assertion that: The laboratory has become the ante-chamber of the court ' (1920: 25) . While questioning the applicability of Ginzburg's model in various respects, questions of a genealogical kind have nevertheless been posed in this paper. It is still possible to speak of 'ignoble origins'. Genealogy follows the main line of descent but also considers its connections with other branches and asks the question: 'why was this 10 The following quotation from a chapter on the historiography of psychiatry elaborates several of the most important ftmajoni of disciplinary histories: 'Disciplinary histories socialize scientific initiates into their endeavour by establishing a line of intellectual filiation between the great minds of the past and contemporary workers. With newly acquired bodies of knowledge, they may argue for the epistemotogical integrity, and therefore identiGc credentials, of a discipline by tracing a suitable line of evolution. They may also assist in sharpening contested interdisciplinary or intradisciplinary boundaries. Furthermore, in periods of paradigmatic conflict, science historic*, by memorializing the proper lineage of figures, texts, and ideas, serve to legitimate particular theories and methodologies and to delegitimate others . . . path taken rather than that?' Questions of this kind that have been asked in this paper are: 'why has the history of criminology marginalized the history of scientific methods in criminal investigation?' and 'how has it happened that the analysis of physical evidence has received more official support and more interest from criminalists than the analysis of psychological clues?' Here the 'false trail' of the use of psychology in criminal investigation was followed. Following up all the connected trails reveals the contingency of the past of both criminology and the practices that Hans Gross came to call 'criminalistics'. However, there is something else of importance as concerns genealogy, something is yet missing.
So finally a return to the cipher with which this paper commenced. The 1907 translation of Gross's manual described it as an 'impudent' message left by criminals, and the 1934 edition as 'impertinent' (Gross 1907 (Gross : 335, 1934 . The significance of this insubordination and of its place in a practitioners' manual intended to subject such argot to the decoding of the expert criminalist should not be overlooked. Forged writing, secret inks, the decipherment of cryptograms, the reading of tattoos . . . The numerous dictionaries of the argot of criminals that appeared throughout the course of the nineteenth century, of which Eugene Vidocq's Les Voleurs was one of the most popular found their place here. Vidocq promised with his publication to unveil the ruses used by rogues and comments that if their language were known they could be spotted just before they were about to commit an offence. From his intimate knowledge of the milieu and mores of the underworld Vidocq, the master of disguises, would provide a guide to enable honest men to protect themselves against criminal depredations.
That is not the only significance of Les Voleurs. It also presented several songs in thieves' argot, which Vidocq duly translated. One of these began with the acclamation: 'A sole feeling moves you: to steal a lot.' The song expressed hatred of the police and their informers, scorn at the fear of imprisonment, and the delicious profanity that thieves preferred to steal on holy days. It ended with the resolution never to leave the trade of the thief: 'prefer to die a thief. Such was the defiance, pride in the brotherhood of the guild of thieves, rejection of the propriety of religious mores in a Catholic country. As such, it should be remembered that the use of scientific methods of criminal investigation, and also that expert discourse on crime, criminology, have as both target and opposition impulsive deeds committed in anger or under the sway of other passions, dissimulation and cunning, a criminality that becomes a way of life, the impenetrable erudition of the argot and customs of a subculture. This insubordination, deceit, recklessness, despair, pleasure, fury, is not successfully suppressed, not even in tales of 'solved' cases, cases in which the scientific investigation is verified by the ideal denouement of a confession, conjectures supported by a panoply of measurements read off the surface of the body, the deployment of the methods of the autopsy, psychological tests, statistics directed at the elucidation of an aetiology, maps of the topography of criminogenic milieux. No aetiology of crime has been found that has enabled the development of a universal panacea. While that quest continues, the development of sophisticated metfiods of criminal investigation has promised: 'We might not be able to stop crime, but we can do something about catching criminals.' Have you worked out what the cipher means yet, this scornful message scrawled on trees by the Austrian criminals of the late nineteenth century? It can be decoded as: 'Where is the thief? Can't you catch him?' (or so Hans Gross put it).
